On Coaseana: Critique of a Political Economy
| Autor: | Nahid Aslanbeigui, Guy Oakes |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />French |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Œconomia, Vol 5, Iss 3, Pp 271-293 (2015) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2113-5207 2269-8450 |
| DOI: | 10.4000/oeconomia.2085 |
| Popis: | Ronald H. Coase’s article of 1960, “The Problem of Social Cost,” sketched a program for economic policy analysis based on three assumptions. (1) A Total Output Premise: the objective of economic policy is to maximize the productive value of the economic system as a whole. (2) A Reciprocity Premise: spillovers or externalities are symmetrical or bilateral. If an economic venture undertaken by A damages B, B also damages A regardless of whether B is a party to the venture—independent of B and its position in the economy, there would be no damage. (3) An Institutional Premise: in the real world of transaction costs, total output is a function of the institutional order in which economic transactions are embedded. For this reason, Coasian economics is a comparative investigation of institutions, conducted to discover the institutional regimes that are most efficient in maximizing total output. The present essay subjects these fundamentals to an immanent critique, arguing that they entail self-destructive consequences Coase did not anticipate. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|