| Autor: |
Ugochukwu Onyekachi Obonna, Felix Kelechi Opara, Christian Chidiebere Mbaocha, Jude-Kennedy Chibuzo Obichere, Isdore Onyema Akwukwaegbu, Miriam Mmesoma Amaefule, Cosmas Ifeanyi Nwakanma |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2023 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Future Internet, Vol 15, Iss 8, p 280 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
1999-5903 |
| DOI: |
10.3390/fi15080280 |
| Popis: |
Recently, the process control network (PCN) of oil and gas installation has been subjected to amorphous cyber-attacks. Examples include the denial-of-service (DoS), distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, and this may have largely been caused by the integration of open network to operation technology (OT) as a result of low-cost network expansion. The connection of OT to the internet for firmware updates, third-party support, or the intervention of vendors has exposed the industry to attacks. The inability to detect these unpredictable cyber-attacks exposes the PCN, and a successful attack can lead to devastating effects. This paper reviews the different forms of cyber-attacks in PCN of oil and gas installations while proposing the use of machine learning algorithms to monitor data exchanges between the sensors, controllers, processes, and the final control elements on the network to detect anomalies in such data exchanges. Python 3.0 Libraries, Deep-Learning Toolkit, MATLAB, and Allen Bradley RSLogic 5000 PLC Emulator software were used in simulating the process control. The outcomes of the experiments show the reliability and functionality of the different machine learning algorithms in detecting these anomalies with significant precise attack detections identified using tree algorithms (bagged or coarse ) for man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks while taking note of accuracy-computation complexity trade-offs. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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