PROTOCOL: Does executive compensation predict publicly traded firms’ financial performance or inaccurate financial reporting?

Autor: Denise M. Rousseau, Donna Beck, ByeongJo Kim, Ryan Splenda, Sarah Young
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2019
Předmět:
Zdroj: Campbell Systematic Reviews, Vol 15, Iss 4, Pp n/a-n/a (2019)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 1891-1803
DOI: 10.1002/cl2.1064
Popis: Abstract This is the protocol for a Campbell review. The objectives are as follows: One goal of this systematic review is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict firm financial performance over time; a second goal is to identify whether incentive terms in CEO contracts predict subsequent inaccurate financial reporting as manifest in restatement of accounting data due to errors or other distortions in reporting financial information.
Databáze: Directory of Open Access Journals