| Autor: |
Józef Bremer |
| Jazyk: |
German<br />English<br />Polish |
| Rok vydání: |
2017 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum, Vol 23, Iss 1 (2017) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2300-1402 |
| DOI: |
10.5281/zenodo.827361 |
| Popis: |
Many philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists argue for the thesis that both the self and free will - as commonly understood by us - are illusions created by our nervous system. An example of such a line of argument can be found in Bruce Hood’s book `The Self Illusion: How the Social Brain Creates Identity'. I first consider the main ideas put forward by Hood in support of the view that the self and free will are illusions. Then I turn to criticisms of his arguments regarding the illusoriness of the self, citing arguments from philosophy and neuroscience. In criticizing his arguments for the illusoriness of free will, I advocate compatibilism and seek to focus on the elucidation of research into our everyday intuitions relating to free will. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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