Autor: |
Claudio Santander Martinez |
Jazyk: |
Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese |
Rok vydání: |
2018 |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
HYBRIS: Revista de Filosofía, Vol 9, Iss 0, Pp 151-199 (2018) |
Druh dokumentu: |
article |
ISSN: |
0718-8382 |
DOI: |
10.5281/zenodo.1320399 |
Popis: |
One difficulty that egalitarianism faces at evaluating a fair wage regime is to avoid preference utilitarianism used by economics to model free markets. What is philosophically problematic then is that a political theory identifies personal preference modelled by markets with the value that a democratic society should attribute to economic freedom. In this article, I critically discuss this identification and argue for an egalitarian criterion of economic opportunity, inspired by J. Rawls’s democratic egalitarianism and by R. Sugden’s impersonal money-metric of opportunities. To do so, I discuss the libertarian thesis of the just wage defended by Felipe Schwember and I show how his position cannot avoid preference utilitarianism and, therefore, that the libertarian thesis’s justification of economic freedom implies a conception of the social good incompatible with the value of democratic society’s equal freedom |
Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
Externí odkaz: |
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