The fallacy of the homuncular fallacy
| Autor: | Figdor Carrie |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Belgrade Philosophical Annual, Vol 2018, Iss 31, Pp 41-56 (2018) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0353-3891 2956-0357 |
| DOI: | 10.5937/BPA1831041F |
| Popis: | A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively 'stupider' capacities ('homunculi') until the mind is 'discharged' by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at sub-personal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how the cognitive sciences are actually integrating mind and matter. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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