Autor: |
Dimitri Dubois, Stefano Farolfi, Phu Nguyen-Van, Juliette Rouchier |
Jazyk: |
angličtina |
Rok vydání: |
2020 |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
PLoS ONE, Vol 15, Iss 10, p e0240212 (2020) |
Druh dokumentu: |
article |
ISSN: |
1932-6203 |
DOI: |
10.1371/journal.pone.0240212 |
Popis: |
This paper experimentally investigates the impact of different information sharing mechanisms in a common-pool resource game, with a view to finding a mechanism that is both efficient and inexpensive for the managing agency. More precisely, we compare the observed extraction levels produced as a result of three mechanisms: a mandatory information sharing mechanism and two voluntary information sharing mechanisms that differ in the degree of freedom given to the players. Our main result is that a voluntary information sharing mechanism could help in reaching a lower average extraction level than that observed with the mandatory mechanism. |
Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
Externí odkaz: |
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