| Autor: |
Nobuiuki Costa Ito, Decio Zylbersztajn |
| Jazyk: |
English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese |
| Rok vydání: |
2016 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
RAUSP: Revista de Administração da Universidade de São Paulo, Vol 51, Iss 1, Pp 5-19 (2016) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
1984-6142 |
| DOI: |
10.5700/rausp1220 |
| Popis: |
ABSTRACT We propose a model to explain how contract terms are selected in the presence of a form of economic power: contract power. The orange juice sector is used to illustrate an analysis that demonstrates the effects of contract power on the economic organization of the sector. We define contract power as the ability to exploit contractual gaps or failures of contractual provisions, which are strategically left incomplete. Empirical evidence from content analysis of antitrust documents supports the logic of contract power in the orange juice sector in three forms: avoiding changes to payment methods from weight to solid contents (quality); using information asymmetries to manipulate indexes that calculate the formula of orange prices; and deliberately harvesting oranges late in order to dehydrate the fruit, which consequently reduces weight and price. The paper contributes to understanding the selection of contract terms and the debate about how antitrust offices can deal with this issue. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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