Do Shared Interests Affect the Accuracy of Budgets?
| Autor: | Ilse Maria Beuren, Franciele Beck, Fabiane Popik |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Portuguese |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Revista Contabilidade & Finanças, Vol 26, Iss 67, Pp 11-26 (2015) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 1808-057X 1808-057x |
| DOI: | 10.1590/1808-057x201512090 |
| Popis: | The creation of budgetary slack is a phenomenon associated with various behavioral aspects. This study focuses on accuracy in budgeting when the benefit of the slack is shared between the unit manager and his/her assistant. In this study, accuracy is measured by the level of slack in the budget, and the benefit of slack represents a financial consideration for the manager and the assistant. The study aims to test how shared interests in budgetary slack affect the accuracy of budget reports in an organization. To this end, an experimental study was conducted with a sample of 90 employees in management and other leadership positions at a cooperative that has a variable compensation plan based on the achievement of organizational goals. The experiment conducted in this study is consubstantiated by the study of Church, Hannan and Kuang (2012), which was conducted with a sample of undergraduate students in the United States and used a quantitative approach to analyze the results. In the first part of the experiment, the results show that when budgetary slack is not shared, managers tend to create greater slack when the assistant is not aware of the creation of slack; these managers thus generate a lower accuracy index than managers whose assistants are aware of the creation of slack. When budgetary slack is shared, there is higher average slack when the assistant is aware of the creation of slack. In the second part of the experiment, the accuracy index is higher for managers who prepare the budget with the knowledge that their assistants prefer larger slack values. However, the accuracy level differs between managers who know that their assistants prefer maximizing slack values and managers who do not know their assistants' preference regarding slack. These results contribute to the literature by presenting evidence of managers' behavior in the creation of budgetary slack in scenarios in which they share the benefits of slack with their assistants. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|