Libet-like Experiments and the Efficacy of the Will
| Autor: | Sofia Bonicalzi |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | German<br />English<br />Italian |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, Vol 6, Iss 1, Pp 130-144 (2015) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2039-4667 2239-2629 |
| DOI: | 10.4453/rifp.2015.0010 |
| Popis: | Skepticism about free will is increasingly often associated with the results of some empirical tests – launched by Libet’s trailblazing experiments on the timing of conscious intentions – aiming to teach us that our apparently free choices are originated unconsciously. In the present paper, I present some theoretical reasons to doubt if the upshots of Libet-like experiments purport to the revolutionary consequences they envisage. I will isolate a couple of points I wish to discuss, since they gained much attention in the recent philosophical debate. First, I claim that actually available neuroscientific data do not offer a solution to the traditional free will quarrel in compatibilist or incompatibilist terms. Second, one might doubt if the kind of free will that is at stake in Libet-like experiments is what really matters for grounding our normative concepts. My conclusion will be that what is scrutinised in Libet-like experiments resembles palely the kind of free will we would like to enjoy. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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