| Autor: |
A. А. Timakov |
| Jazyk: |
ruština |
| Rok vydání: |
2024 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Российский технологический журнал, Vol 12, Iss 2 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2500-316X |
| DOI: |
10.32362/2500-316X-2024-12-2-16-27 |
| Popis: |
Objectives. Verification of software security is typically performed using dynamic and static analysis tools. The corresponding types of analysis do not usually consider the business logic of the software and do not rely on data access control policies. A modern approach to resolving this problem is to implement language-based information flow control. Despite a large amount of research, mechanisms for information flow control in software are not widely used in practice. This is because they are complex and impose increased demands on developers. The aim of the work is to transfer information flow control from the language level to the level of formal verification. This will enable the functions of controlling data integrity and confidentiality in software to be isolated into a separate task, which can be resolved by information security analysts.Methods. The research is based on general formal security methods for computer systems and formal verification methods. The algorithm developed by the author for checking security specifications and resolving security violations uses temporal logic of actions.Results. The technology is presented as a step-by-step approach to resolving specific tasks, including the following: designing a database (DB) for storing and processing sensitive information; analyzing dependencies and identifying relevant sets of program blocks in the DB; generating TLA+ specifications for the identified program blocks; labeling specifications according to global security policy rules and additional constraints; applying the specification verification algorithm, and resolving security violations while providing recommendations for software developers. The procedure also involves analyzing labeled data, in order to control the spread of verified program block output values in external software modules.Conclusions. The technology presented herein does not require developers to include redundant annotations describing security policy rules. The function of analyzing information flows with reference to predefined access restrictions is moved to a separate stage of the software development life cycle. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
