Bayesian Bullshit

Autor: Sajan Srivastava, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Rakesh Vohra
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2024
Předmět:
Zdroj: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Vol 9, Iss 1, Pp 13-53 (2024)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 2399-844X
2399-8458
DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.003
Popis: A bullshitter neither knows nor cares about the truth, and therefore, it has been asserted, is more pernicious than a liar. We examine this assertion within the standard model of cheap talk communication where a bullshitter is modeled as an uninformed Sender. We show that in some circumstances, uncertainty about whether the Sender is informed or not can increase the welfare of the Receiver.
Databáze: Directory of Open Access Journals