How Do We Know That We Are Free?
| Autor: | Timothy O’Connor |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol 15, Iss 2, Pp 79-98 (2019) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 1845-8475 1849-0514 |
| DOI: | 10.31820/ejap.15.2.4 |
| Popis: | We are naturally disposed to believe of ourselves and others that we are free: that what we do is often and to a considerable extent ‘up to us’ via the exercise of a power of choice to do or to refrain from doing one or more alternatives of which we are aware. In this article, I probe thesource and epistemic justification of our ‘freedom belief’. I propose an account that (unlike most) does not lean heavily on our first-personal experience of choice and action, and instead regards freedom belief as a priori justified. I will then consider possible replies available toincompatibilists to the contention made by some compatibilists that the ‘privileged’ epistemic status of freedom belief (which my account endorses) supports a minimalist, and therefore compatibilist view of the nature of freedom itself. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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