Autor: |
Pierce Ryan, John Fokker, Sorcha Healy, Andreas Amann |
Jazyk: |
angličtina |
Rok vydání: |
2022 |
Předmět: |
|
Zdroj: |
IEEE Access, Vol 10, Pp 32836-32844 (2022) |
Druh dokumentu: |
article |
ISSN: |
2169-3536 |
DOI: |
10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3160748 |
Popis: |
In this paper, we consider how the development of targeted ransomware has affected the dynamics of ransomware negotiations to better understand how to respond to ransomware attacks. We construct a model of ransomware negotiations as an asymmetric non-cooperative two-player game. In particular, our model considers the investments that a malicious actor must make in order to conduct a successful targeted ransomware attack. We demonstrate how imperfect information is a crucial feature for replicating observed real-world behaviour. Furthermore, we present optimal strategies for both the malicious actor and the target, and demonstrate how imperfect information results in a non-trivial optimal strategy for the malicious actor. |
Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
Externí odkaz: |
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