Exploitation of a Productive Asset in the Presence of Strategic Behavior and Pollution Externalities

Autor:	N. Baris Vardar, Georges Zaccour
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	productive asset oligopoly pollution externalities dynamic games Mathematics QA1-939
Zdroj:	Mathematics, Vol 8, Iss 10, p 1682 (2020)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	2227-7390
DOI:	10.3390/math8101682
Popis:	We study the strategic behavior of firms competing in the exploitation of a common-access productive asset, in the presence of pollution externalities. We consider a differential game with two state variables (asset stock and pollution stock), and by using a piecewise-linear approximation of the nonlinear asset growth function, we provide a tractable characterization of the symmetric feedback–Nash equilibrium with asymptotically stable steady state(s). The results show that the firm’s strategy takes three forms depending on the pair of state variables and that different options for the model parameters lead to contrasting outcomes in both the short- and long-run equilibria.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
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