Evolution reinforces cooperation with the emergence of self-recognition mechanisms: An empirical study of strategies in the Moran process for the iterated prisoner's dilemma.

Autor: Vincent Knight, Marc Harper, Nikoleta E Glynatsi, Owen Campbell
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
Zdroj: PLoS ONE, Vol 13, Iss 10, p e0204981 (2018)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0204981
Popis: We present insights and empirical results from an extensive numerical study of the evolutionary dynamics of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Fixation probabilities for Moran processes are obtained for all pairs of 164 different strategies including classics such as TitForTat, zero determinant strategies, and many more sophisticated strategies. Players with long memories and sophisticated behaviours outperform many strategies that perform well in a two player setting. Moreover we introduce several strategies trained with evolutionary algorithms to excel at the Moran process. These strategies are excellent invaders and resistors of invasion and in some cases naturally evolve handshaking mechanisms to resist invasion. The best invaders were those trained to maximize total payoff while the best resistors invoke handshake mechanisms. This suggests that while maximizing individual payoff can lead to the evolution of cooperation through invasion, the relatively weak invasion resistance of payoff maximizing strategies are not as evolutionarily stable as strategies employing handshake mechanisms.
Databáze: Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:
Nepřihlášeným uživatelům se plný text nezobrazuje