Could Robot Judges Believe? Epistemic Ambitions of the Criminal Trial as we approach the Digital Age
| Autor: | Sabine Gless |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Italian<br />Portuguese |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Quaestio Facti, Iss 5 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2660-4515 2604-6202 |
| DOI: | 10.33115/udg_bib/qf.i5.22849 |
| Popis: | Criminal proof is unique, in that it must be able to account for the justification of both: accurate fact-finding and a fair trial. This is Sarah Summers’ main message in her article on the epistemic ambitions of the criminal trial, which focusses on belief as a sort of proxy for societal acceptance of truth as a set of facts established by compliance to procedural rules. This commentary tests her finding by scrutinizing whether it is conceivable that robots, complying to all rules, assist in fact-finding with a specific form of legal belief based on a sophisticated probability weighting opaque to humans. The result is in accordance with Sarah Summers: as long as robots cannot explain their beliefs, any criminal proof based on them flounders as it can neither be part of a fair trial nor ensure acceptance in the existing institutional framework. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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