Incentivizing CEOs via pay and forced turnover: Do tenure and managerial ability matter?

Autor:	Nadide BANU OLCAY GÜNER
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2023
Předmět:	incentives ceo pay ceo dismissal managerial ability job tenure Business HF5001-6182 Economic theory. Demography HB1-3840 Economics as a science HB71-74
Zdroj:	Theoretical and Applied Economics, Vol XXX, Iss 1, Pp 37-66 (2023)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	1841-8678 1844-0029 50614479
Popis:	Direct pay and dismissal for poor performance are important instruments to incentivize CEOs. I empirically analyze how the use of them depends on tenure and managerial ability. For managers promoted from within a firm, ability is proxied by age at the time of promotion. For outside hires, I use constructed measures of reputation based on media citations. Using a sample of firms in S&P 1500, I find that pay and performance sensitivity of dismissal probability increase with tenure. For outsider CEOs, better reputation increases pay, but decreases tenure sensitivity of pay with stronger effects for more current measures. For both insiders and outsiders, ability decreases the dismissal probability.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/34e2be3f50614479acdc3aae29908d5d Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ Plný text ve formátu PDF