Can Self-determined Actions be Predictable?
| Autor: | Amit |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol 15, Iss 2, Pp 121-140 (2019) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 1845-8475 1849-0514 |
| DOI: | 10.31820/ejap.15.2.6 |
| Popis: | This paper examines Lockie’s theory of libertarian self-determinism in light of the question of prediction: “Can we know (or justifiably believe) how an agent will act, or is likely to act, freely?” I argue that, when Lockie's theory is taken to its full logical extent, free actions cannot be predicted to any degree of accuracy because, even if they have probabilities, these cannot be known. However, I suggest that this implication of his theory is actually advantageous, because it is able to explain and justify an important feature of the practices we use to determine whether someone has acted culpably: our hostility to the use of predictive evidence. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|