| Autor: |
Gottfried Schweiger |
| Jazyk: |
angličtina |
| Rok vydání: |
2024 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Philosophies, Vol 9, Iss 4, p 120 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
2409-9287 |
| DOI: |
10.3390/philosophies9040120 |
| Popis: |
Ulrika Carlsson has argued that it its justified to harbor non-moral resentment towards a person with whom one is unrequitedly in love. Anca Gheaus has rejected this with convincing arguments. This text explores the question of whether Gheaus’ verdict changes if the person being loved has previously flirted with the loving person. For this, it is first relevant what flirting actually is and how it relates to falling in love and love. On this basis, it is argued here that in the case of flirting, the non-moral resentment of the loved person defended by Carlsson is appropriate. By flirting, he or she has contributed to the unrequited love, even if he or she cannot be held responsible for it in a moral sense. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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