Tax evasion: a game countermeasure
| Autor: | David Carfi', Francesco Musolino |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Italian |
| Rok vydání: | 2015 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Atti della Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti : Classe di Scienze Fisiche, Matematiche e Naturali, Vol 93, Iss 1, p C2 (2015) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0365-0359 1825-1242 21945055 |
| DOI: | 10.1478/AAPP.931C2 |
| Popis: | We propose a game-theoretic model analyzing the interaction between the State and any possible relative taxpayer, by using a realistic probability (frequency) approach to the checking evasion strategy. Starting from Allingham and Sandmo's model (1972), we study a possible measure to prevent tax evasion and we also propose a ``honesty-award'' for Taxpayers declaring their entire income by using two Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. This methodology leaves room for further development of the model, leading to a self-identification by tax evaders and honest citizens. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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