First Person and Body Ownership
| Autor: | Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Spanish; Castilian |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Literatura y Filosofía, Vol 29, Iss 2 (2019) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0716-7520 0719-3262 |
| Popis: | Bodily and mental self-ascriptions are forms of first-person thought where a subject attributes physical properties and psychological states to herself. The body-ownership view argues that a necessary and sufficient condition on such self-ascriptions is the existence of causal links between a spatio-temporal body and the self-ascribed properties or states. However, since P.F. Strawson’s influential attack, this view has been dismissed as a bad philosophical idea. The goal of this brief piece is to outline the body-ownership view and neutralise two classic lines of objection against it: on the one hand, that the stance is incoherent; and, on the other, that it has counterintuitive implications. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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