A New Formulation for Damascius' Critique on the Neoplatonic Transcendent Principle
| Autor: | Mohammad Habibollahi, Ahmad Asgari |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />Persian |
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Philosophical Investigations, Vol 17, Iss 43, Pp 320-337 (2023) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2251-7960 2423-4419 |
| DOI: | 10.22034/jpiut.2022.51688.3217 |
| Popis: | Perhaps assuming a principle which is beyond reason and being is the most characteristic of the Neoplatonic thought. This principle is absolutely ineffable and no epithet deserves it. We can talk about it merely by negation. But such a transcendent principle, which Plotinus introduced it to the platonic philosophy, did not remain without any critique among Neoplatonists. The most elaborated critique by a Neoplatonist is that of Damascius in the first part of his Problems and Solutions. He argues that the One, being an arche, cannot be transcendent, and being transcendent, refuses to be an arche. So, there is an inconsistency between being an arche and being transcendent. Therefore, the Neoplatonic One, which is the first principle, is not beyond being, rather it is a being. However, this claim, which is the corner stone of Damascius’ argument, has been neglected by the writers on the topic, and they have sought other formulations for his argument. Based on Damascius’ texts, we have argued that we can ascribe such a claim to Damascius, and further, regard it as the foundation of his belief in an absolutely transcendent beyond the One, which is completely ineffable and about which only silence is due. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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