Has the Naturalistic Fallacy Refutation Truly Defeated Classical Natural Law Theory?

Autor:	Carlos A. Casanova
Jazyk:	German<br />English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Italian<br />Portuguese
Rok vydání:	2014
Předmět:	G. E. Moore noción de bien ley de Hume ética realista razón práctica. Metaphysics BD95-131 Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Zdroj:	Logos, Vol 47, Iss 0, Pp 37-54 (2014)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	1575-6866 1988-3242
DOI:	10.5209/rev_ASEM.2014.v47.45801
Popis:	This paper considers and distinguishes two objections which ordinarily are thought to oppose a realistic conception of ethics: G. E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s law. After having presented both objections, having developed their presuppositions and consequences and having answered each of them, the paper concludes that it is possible to hold today a realistic conception of ethics. It is structured in the style of a disputed question, divided in six articles.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/1dac85fa5381430da7223f272897097b Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ