| Popis: |
To reduce financial pressure and operational risk, and improve match between supply and demand, an increasing number of enterprises are adopting presales to launch new products. In this context, this paper investigates three presale models for innovative products, namely, the no-presale model, the manufacturer presale model and the retailer presale model. A Hotelling model is used to describe the impact of channel preferences and valuation differences on the two-stage competition between innovative products. Aiming at evaluating the purchase behavior of consumers under three presale modes, a game optimization model is established to analyze the presale decision problem for innovative products under different presale entities. The research shows that: (1) Compared with no-presale, presales can help enterprises obtain more profits. The overall profit of the supply chain is optimal under the retailer presale mode. (2) When the difference in channel preferences is small, the manufacturer obtains the greatest profit by choosing the direct presale model. In contrast, the selection of different presale entities has a significant impact on product sales and supply chain enterprise profits. At this point, the manufacturer should choose the retailer presale model. (3) When the product valuation discount is high, the manufacturer can increase the spot and wholesale prices to induce consumers to choose the presale method to purchase the product. In the opposite situation, the manufacturer should lower the presale price to improve the presale utility of consumers and encourage them to participate in the presale. These conclusions provide more targeted suggestions for enterprises to formulate presale strategies, which can help them grasp market demand and improve market competitiveness. |
