| Autor: |
Rafael Graebin Vogelmann |
| Jazyk: |
English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese |
| Rok vydání: |
2024 |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Filosofia Unisinos, Vol 25, Iss 3 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: |
article |
| ISSN: |
1984-8234 |
| DOI: |
10.4013/fsu.2024.253.10 |
| Popis: |
Some of our reasons for acting are grounded precisely on the fact that we are not fully virtuous agents. This shows that the intuitive view that what we should do is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances we find ourselves is false. Many take this to show that there is not a close connection between virtue and practical reasons. I hold that this is a mistake. I argue that a failure to act in light of a decisive reason always amounts to a flaw from the standpoint of virtue. This is the case even when it comes to reasons grounded in defects of character. The upshot is that our conception of virtue constraints the normative judgments we can accept. That is the case because every reason must be grounded in a value that is compatible with virtue. I conclude that even though we should not always act as a virtuous person, we should always act in response to values that a virtuous person could uphold. |
| Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
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