Price and location equilibria in a circular market: a pure vs a mixed duopsony with a co-operative
| Autor: | Panos FOUSEKIS, Dimitrios PANAGIOTOU |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2013 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Agricultural Economics (AGRICECON), Vol 59, Iss 8, Pp 341-347 (2013) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0139-570X 1805-9295 |
| DOI: | 10.17221/129/2012-AGRICECON |
| Popis: | The objective of the present paper is to analyze the location-price competition in circular markets where the power lies with the buyers. To this end, it considers two alternative market structures. Namely, the pure ones, where the buyers of a primary commodity are private firms, and mixed ones, where a private firm competes against a producer's co-operative. According to the results, the pure-strategy location equilibrium in both cases involves a distance between the two players larger or equal to 1/4. Nevertheless, the equilibriums are qualitatively different. In the pure duopsony, a large distance is required to prevent a price war while in the mixed duopsony, the private firm tries to stay away from the co-op in order to ensure a strictly positive profit. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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