An Investigation on the Argument of Allameh Dawani in Proving the Necessary Being and its Comparison with Avicennian Seddiqin argument
| Autor: | Mahmood Ahesteh |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | perština |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | حکمت سینوی, Vol 22, Iss 60, Pp 121-133 (2019) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2538-5275 2538-5267 |
| Popis: | Ibn Sina Seddiqin argument (proof of the righteous) is one of the important arguments in proving the Necessary Being that, along with Ibn Sina's expositions, The later philosophers have quoted or criticized it; among the philosophers who have carefully considered the argument and presented a specific explanation, is Allameh Dawani. He also names his argument in proving the Necessary Being, the same as Ibn Sina Seddiqin argument, but states the principle in a way that differentiates it from other explanations. According to his argument, which he considers to be the strongest and most reliable way of proving the Necessary Being, he has conceived the possible beings as series Cause and effect, if there is no Necessary Being, none of them can be realized and as a result, they can be annihilated. Thus, this article aims to explain, analyze and criticize Dawani's view and compare it with Avicennian proof. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
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