Joint Commitment and Collective Belief: a Revisionary Proposal
| Autor: | Leo Townsend |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | English<br />French<br />Italian |
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Phenomenology and Mind, Iss 9 (2016) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 2280-7853 2239-4028 |
| DOI: | 10.13128/Phe_Mi-18151 |
| Popis: | According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing joint commitment, in order to avoid the concern. This leads me to propose a revised Gilbertian account of collective belief, according to which two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to p as true. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|