Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery

Autor: Michael Devitt
Jazyk: English<br />Spanish; Castilian
Rok vydání: 2012
Předmět:
Zdroj: Theoria, Vol 27, Iss 2, Pp 229-233 (2012)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 0495-4548
2171-679X
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.6225
Popis: Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks theoretical and empirical support. (2) cannot be right because usage provides the evidence that intuitions are reliable.
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