Autor: |
Seong-Joo Han, Joon-Kyu Han, Gyeong-Jun Yun, Mun-Woo Lee, Ji-Man Yu, Yang-Kyu Choi |
Jazyk: |
angličtina |
Rok vydání: |
2022 |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
Scientific Reports, Vol 12, Iss 1, Pp 1-10 (2022) |
Druh dokumentu: |
article |
ISSN: |
2045-2322 |
DOI: |
10.1038/s41598-021-03994-2 |
Popis: |
Abstract Although SRAM is a well-established type of volatile memory, data remanence has been observed at low temperature even for a power-off state, and thus it is vulnerable to a physical cold boot attack. To address this, an ultra-fast data sanitization method within 5 ns is demonstrated with physics-based simulations for avoidance of the cold boot attack to SRAM. Back-bias, which can control device parameters of CMOS, such as threshold voltage and leakage current, was utilized for the ultra-fast data sanitization. It is applicable to temporary erasing with data recoverability against a low-level attack as well as permanent erasing with data irrecoverability against a high-level attack. |
Databáze: |
Directory of Open Access Journals |
Externí odkaz: |
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