The Human Being as ‘Compound’: Aquinas versus Descartes on Human Nature
| Autor: | John Cottingham |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | Czech<br />English<br />Slovak |
| Rok vydání: | 2024 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Filozofia, Vol 79, Iss 9 (2024) |
| Druh dokumentu: | article |
| ISSN: | 0046-385X 2585-7061 |
| DOI: | 10.31577/filozofia.2024.79.9.1 |
| Popis: | The intuitively right answer to the question ‘What am I?’ is not ‘an incorporeal spirit’, but ‘a human being’. Aquinas reflects this common-sense view when he says that ‘the human is no mere soul, but a compound of soul and body.’ And Descartes, despite his notorious dualistic thesis that I am a substance that does not need anything material in order to exist, insists nevertheless that the human mind-body compound is a genuine unity in its own right, not a mere soul making using of a body. This paper argues for the enduring philosophical importance of this notion of our ‘compound’ nature as human beings, and explores its significance across three principal dimensions – the psychological, the phenomenological, and the moral. |
| Databáze: | Directory of Open Access Journals |
| Externí odkaz: |
|