Internalism and the frege: Geach problem

Autor:	Strandberg Caj
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2019
Předmět:	moral judgment motivation frege-geach problem embedding internalism externalism cognitivism expressivism hybrid view ecumenical view besire Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Zdroj:	Belgrade Philosophical Annual, Vol 2019, Iss 32, Pp 67-91 (2019)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	0353-3891 2956-0357
DOI:	10.5937/BPA1932067S
Popis:	According to the established understanding of the Frege-Geach problem, it is a challenge exclusively for metaethical expressivism. In this paper, I argue that it is much wider in scope: The problem applies generally to views according to which moral sentences express moral judgments entailing that one is for or against something, irrespective of what mental states the judgments consist in. In particular, it applies to motivational internalism about moral judgments. Most noteworthy, it applies to cognitivist internalism according to which moral judgments consist in motivating beliefs. Hence, in order for a metaethical view to evade the Frege-Geach problem, it should avoid stating that moral judgments are motivating.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/04272712a6b74223982855c3735050be Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ