UN Security Council decision-making: testing the bribery hypothesis

Autor: Eugenio Pacelli Lazzarotti Diniz Costa, Mariana Baccarini
Jazyk: English<br />Spanish; Castilian<br />Portuguese
Rok vydání: 2014
Předmět:
Zdroj: Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, Vol 57, Iss 2, Pp 29-57 (2014)
Druh dokumentu: article
ISSN: 1983-3121
0034-7329
DOI: 10.1590/0034-7329201400303
Popis: Liberal-Institutionalism and Structural Realism expectations about international organizations are confronted by looking at if and how US-controlled international aid is granted, and particularly if it is related or not to political affinity and to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent membership. A preliminary assessment suggests that these relations only hold for the period of the Cold War, and, even then, only when UNSC non-permanent membership is in years in which the Security Council was deemed very important.
Databáze: Directory of Open Access Journals