Invariant Equilibrium in Discontinuous Bayesian Games

Autor:	Blake A. Allison, Jason J. Lepore
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2024
Předmět:	discontinuous Bayesian game invariance equilibrium existence random superior payoff matching random weak efficiency Technology Social Sciences
Zdroj:	Games, Vol 15, Iss 3, p 17 (2024)
Druh dokumentu:	article
ISSN:	2073-4336
DOI:	10.3390/g15030017
Popis:	We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form is better-reply secure. The invariance property then provides an existence result for all Bayesian games in the class. Results are shown for both pure strategy and behavioral strategy equilibrium. We illustrate the application of the results with an example of a class of contests with bid caps.
Databáze:	Directory of Open Access Journals
Externí odkaz:	https://doaj.org/article/01775cc710f74a90bb8a7c31d53fb35b Zobrazit plný text záznamu View record in DOAJ Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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