Fisheries Problems and Bureaucracy in Aquaculture Anti-Commons View
| Autor: | Filipe, José António, Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M., Coelho, Manuel, Pedro, Maria Isabel C. |
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| Rok vydání: | 2024 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| DOI: | 10.7813/einas.2012/2-1/3 |
| Popis: | The problems raised by anti-commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan and Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a multitude of agents that have deciding power. At the view of conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or too many administrative circuits push for too late decisions, or for non-rational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents. Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an anti-commons problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned exclusion rights, which may be exercised. Anti-commons problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented. Comment: 10 pages and no figures |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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