Self-Defense: Optimal QIF Solutions and Application to Website Fingerprinting
| Autor: | Athanasiou, Andreas, Chatzikokolakis, Konstantinos, Palamidessi, Catuscia |
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| Rok vydání: | 2024 |
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| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| Popis: | Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) provides a robust information-theoretical framework for designing secure systems with minimal information leakage. While previous research has addressed the design of such systems under hard constraints (e.g. application limitations) and soft constraints (e.g. utility), scenarios often arise where the core system's behavior is considered fixed. In such cases, the challenge is to design a new component for the existing system that minimizes leakage without altering the original system. In this work we address this problem by proposing optimal solutions for constructing a new row, in a known and unmodifiable information-theoretic channel, aiming at minimizing the leakage. We first model two types of adversaries: an exact-guessing adversary, aiming to guess the secret in one try, and a s-distinguishing one, which tries to distinguish the secret s from all the other secrets.Then, we discuss design strategies for both fixed and unknown priors by offering, for each adversary, an optimal solution under linear constraints, using Linear Programming.We apply our approach to the problem of website fingerprinting defense, considering a scenario where a site administrator can modify their own site but not others. We experimentally evaluate our proposed solutions against other natural approaches. First, we sample real-world news websites and then, for both adversaries, we demonstrate that the proposed solutions are effective in achieving the least leakage. Finally, we simulate an actual attack by training an ML classifier for the s-distinguishing adversary and show that our approach decreases the accuracy of the attacker. Comment: 38th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, IEEE, Jun 2025, Santa Cruz, United States |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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