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Consider a bilateral trade scenario where a seller seeks to sell an item to a buyer through a trusted mediator. The item's quality is the seller's private information, and the buyer's valuation of the item depends on both the quality and the buyer's type. The mediator, who is uninformed about the private information of both the seller and buyer, aims to design a mechanism that elicits and reveals information to facilitate communication between two agents. The mediator can also charge a fee for providing such services. In this work, we study the problem of designing mechanisms that maximize revenue for the mediator. We formulate this mechanism design problem as an optimization problem that involves non-linear constraints. Interestingly, under the monotone hazard rate assumption, we can bypass this issue by considering a relaxed problem and showing that the solution to the relaxed problem remains optimal to the original one. In optimal mechanisms, the mediator directly recommends whether to trade after eliciting the agents' types. The mediator privately offers a price to each agent if a trade is recommended. The optimal mechanism adopts a threshold information structure, i.e., it only reveals to the agent whether the other agent's type exceeds a certain threshold. The optimal payment function of buyer is monotone decreasing to their type, which differs from most existing works. Finally, we discuss some interesting observations revealed by the optimal mechanism. |
