The Condorcet Dimension of Metric Spaces

Autor:	Lassota, Alexandra, Vetta, Adrian, von Stengel, Bernhard
Rok vydání:	2024
Předmět:	Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Computer Science - Multiagent Systems
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is the minimum cardinality of a Condorcet winning set, is known to be at most logarithmic in the number of candidates. We study the case of elections where voters and candidates are located in a $2$-dimensional space with preferences based upon proximity voting. Our main result is that the Condorcet dimension is at most $3$, under both the Manhattan norm and the infinity norm, natural measures in electoral systems. Comment: 9 pages
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.09201 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv