Counterexamples to 'Transitive Regret'
Autor: | Chang, Yuan, Liu, Shuo Li |
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Rok vydání: | 2024 |
Předmět: | |
Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
Popis: | Theorem 1 in Bikhchandani & Segal (2011; Theoretical Economics) suggests that a complete, transitive, monotonic, and continuous preference is regret based if and only if it is expected utility. Their Proposition 1 suggests that transitivity and continuity of a regret-based preference implies an equivalence condition: if random variables $X$ and $Y$ have the same distribution, then $X\sim Y$. We give counterexamples to Proposition 1. |
Databáze: | arXiv |
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