| Autor: |
Lipnowski, Elliot, Ravid, Doron, Shishkin, Denis |
| Rok vydání: |
2024 |
| Předmět: |
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| Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
| Popis: |
A sender commits to an experiment to persuade a receiver. Accounting for the sender's experiment-choice incentives, and not presupposing a receiver tie-breaking rule when indifferent, we characterize when the sender's equilibrium payoff is unique and so coincides with her "Bayesian persuasion" value. A sufficient condition in finite models is that every action which is receiver-optimal at some belief is uniquely optimal at some other belief -- a generic property. We similarly show the equilibrium sender payoff is typically unique in ordered models. In an extension, we show uniqueness generates robustness to imperfect sender commitment. |
| Databáze: |
arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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