| Popis: |
Historians and political economists have long debated the processes that led land in frontier regions, managed commons, and a variety of customary landholding regimes to be enclosed and transformed into more exclusive forms of private property. Using the framework of aggregative games, we examine land-holding regimes where access to land is established via possession and use, and then explore the factors that may initiate decentralized privatization processes. Factors including population density, potential for technology improvement, enclosure costs, shifts in group cohesion and bargaining power, or the policy and institutional environment determine the equilibrium mix of property regimes. While decentralized processes yield efficient enclosure and technological transformation in some circumstances, in others, the outcomes fall short of second-best. This stems from the interaction of different spillover effects, leading to inefficiently low rates of enclosure and technological transformation in some cases and excessive enclosure in others. Implementing policies to strengthen customary governance, compensate displaced stakeholders, or subsidize/tax enclosure can realign incentives. However, addressing one market failure while overlooking others can worsen outcomes. Our analysis offers a unified framework for evaluating claimed mechanisms and processes across Neoclassical, neo-institutional, and Marxian interpretations of enclosure processes. |
