Stochastic vaccination game among influencers, leader and public
| Autor: | Singh, Vartika, Kavitha, Veeraruna |
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| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| Popis: | Celebrities can significantly influence the public towards any desired outcome. In a bid to tackle an infectious disease, a leader (government) exploits such influence towards motivating a fraction of public to get vaccinated, sufficient enough to ensure eradication. The leader also aims to minimize the vaccinated fraction of public (that ensures eradication) and use minimal incentives to motivate the influencers; it also controls vaccine-supply-rates. Towards this, we consider a three-layered Stackelberg game, with the leader at the top. A set of influencers at the middle layer are involved in a stochastic vaccination game driven by incentives. The public at the bottom layer is involved in an evolutionary game with respect to vaccine responses. We prove the disease can always be eradicated once the public is sufficiently sensitive towards the vaccination choices of the influencers -- with a minimal fraction of public vaccinated. This minimal fraction depends only on the disease characteristics and not on other aspects. Interestingly, there are many configurations to achieve eradication, each configuration is specified by a dynamic vaccine-supply-rate and a number -- this number represents the count of the influencers that needs to be vaccinated to achieve the desired influence. Incentive schemes are optimal when this number equals all or just one; the former curbs free-riding among influencers while the latter minimizes the dependency on influencers. Comment: 50 pages, 6 figures |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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