Two-Player Incomplete Games of Resilient Multiagent Systems

Autor:	Nugraha, Yurid, Hayakawa, Tomohisa, Ishii, Hideaki, Cetinkaya, Ahmet, Zhu, Quanyan
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Electrical Engineering and Systems Science - Systems and Control Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a game-theoretical approach of multiagent systems where the players have incomplete information on their opponents' strength. We consider repeated games with both simultaneous and sequential player actions where players update their beliefs of each other over time. The effect of the players' optimal strategies according to Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium on agents' consensus is examined. It is shown that an attacker with incomplete knowledge may fail to prevent consensus despite having sufficient resources to do so. Comment: 9 pages, 6 figures. Accepted in IFAC-WC 2023
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/2212.01570 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv