Lightweight Techniques for Private Heavy Hitters
| Autor: | Boneh, Dan, Boyle, Elette, Corrigan-Gibbs, Henry, Gilboa, Niv, Ishai, Yuval |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| Popis: | This paper presents Poplar, a new system for solving the private heavy-hitters problem. In this problem, there are many clients and a small set of data-collection servers. Each client holds a private bitstring. The servers want to recover the set of all popular strings, without learning anything else about any client's string. A web-browser vendor, for instance, can use Poplar to figure out which homepages are popular, without learning any user's homepage. We also consider the simpler private subset-histogram problem, in which the servers want to count how many clients hold strings in a particular set without revealing this set to the clients. Poplar uses two data-collection servers and, in a protocol run, each client send sends only a single message to the servers. Poplar protects client privacy against arbitrary misbehavior by one of the servers and our approach requires no public-key cryptography (except for secure channels), nor general-purpose multiparty computation. Instead, we rely on incremental distributed point functions, a new cryptographic tool that allows a client to succinctly secret-share the labels on the nodes of an exponentially large binary tree, provided that the tree has a single non-zero path. Along the way, we develop new general tools for providing malicious security in applications of distributed point functions. Comment: Appeared at IEEE Security & Privacy 2021 |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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