Can I Take Your Subdomain? Exploring Related-Domain Attacks in the Modern Web
| Autor: | Squarcina, Marco, Tempesta, Mauro, Veronese, Lorenzo, Calzavara, Stefano, Maffei, Matteo |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| Popis: | Related-domain attackers control a sibling domain of their target web application, e.g., as the result of a subdomain takeover. Despite their additional power over traditional web attackers, related-domain attackers received only limited attention by the research community. In this paper we define and quantify for the first time the threats that related-domain attackers pose to web application security. In particular, we first clarify the capabilities that related-domain attackers can acquire through different attack vectors, showing that different instances of the related-domain attacker concept are worth attention. We then study how these capabilities can be abused to compromise web application security by focusing on different angles, including: cookies, CSP, CORS, postMessage and domain relaxation. By building on this framework, we report on a large-scale security measurement on the top 50k domains from the Tranco list that led to the discovery of vulnerabilities in 887 sites, where we quantified the threats posed by related-domain attackers to popular web applications. Comment: Submitted to USENIX Security '21 on 16 Oct 2020 |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
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