Optimal Questionnaires for Screening of Strategic Agents

Autor:	Vora, Anuj S., Kulkarni, Ankur A.
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Computer Science - Information Retrieval Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory Mathematics - Optimization and Control 91A28 94D99
Druh dokumentu:	Working Paper
Popis:	During the COVID-$19$ pandemic the health authorities at airports and train stations try to screen and identify the travellers possibly exposed to the virus. However, many individuals avoid getting tested and hence may misreport their travel history. This is a challenge for the health authorities who wish to ascertain the truly susceptible cases in spite of this strategic misreporting. We investigate the problem of questioning travellers to classify them for further testing when the travellers are strategic or are unwilling to reveal their travel histories. We show there are fundamental limits to how many travel histories the health authorities can recover.% can be correctly classified by any probing mechanism. Comment: Longer version of our paper submitted to ICASSP 2021
Databáze:	arXiv
Externí odkaz:	http://arxiv.org/abs/2010.15008 Zobrazit plný text záznamu View this record from Arxiv