| Autor: |
Bikhchandani, Sushil, Mishra, Debasis |
| Rok vydání: |
2020 |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Journal of Economic Theory, 200 (2022), 105397 |
| Druh dokumentu: |
Working Paper |
| DOI: |
10.1016/j.jet.2021.105397 |
| Popis: |
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent. We show that under a well-known condition on distributions~(due to McAfee and McMillan (1988)), (a) it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically in the DMV model and (b) it is optimal to bundle (which is a deterministic mechanism) in the IMV model. Under a stronger sufficient condition on distributions, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in the DMV model. Our results apply to heterogeneous objects when there is a specified sequence in which the two objects must be sold. |
| Databáze: |
arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
