Fairness principles for insurance contracts in the presence of default risk
| Autor: | Coculescu, Delia, Delbaen, Freddy |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: | |
| Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
| Popis: | We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance contracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the analysis that when a contract is exposed to the default risk of the insurance company, ex-ante equilibrium considerations require a certain participation in the benefit of the company to be specified in the contracts. The fair benefit participation of agents appears as an outcome of a game involving the residual risks induced by the default possibility and using fuzzy coalitions. Comment: 25 pages |
| Databáze: | arXiv |
| Externí odkaz: |
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