Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs
Autor: | Agarwal, Aishwarya, Elkind, Edith, Gan, Jiarui, Voudouris, Alexandros A. |
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Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: | |
Druh dokumentu: | Working Paper |
Popis: | We study a recently introduced class of strategic games that is motivated by and generalizes Schelling's well-known residential segregation model. These games are played on undirected graphs, with the set of agents partitioned into multiple types; each agent either occupies a node of the graph and never moves away or aims to maximize the fraction of her neighbors who are of her own type. We consider a variant of this model that we call swap Schelling games, where the number of agents is equal to the number of nodes of the graph, and agents may {\em swap} positions with other agents to increase their utility. We study the existence, computational complexity and quality of equilibrium assignments in these games, both from a social welfare perspective and from a diversity perspective. Comment: AAAI 2020 |
Databáze: | arXiv |
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